In this work we propose a general approach for detecting distributed malicious activity in which individual attack sources each operate in a stealthy, low-profile manner. We base our approach on observing statistically significant changes in a parameter that summarizes aggregate activity, bracketing a distributed attack in time, and then determining which sources present during that interval appear to have coordinated their activity. We apply this approach to the problem of detecting stealthy distributed SSH bruteforcing activity, showing that we can model the process of legitimate users failing to authenticate using a beta-binomial distribution, which enables us to tune a detector that trades off an expected level of false positives versus time-to-detection. Using the detector we study the prevalence of distributed bruteforcing, finding dozens of instances in an extensive 8-year dataset collected from a site with several thousand SSH users. Many of the attacks-some of which last months-would be quite difficult to detect individually. While a number of the attacks reflect indiscriminant global probing, we also find attacks that targeted only the local site, as well as occasional attacks that succeeded.
INTRODUCTION
A longstanding challenge for detecting malicious activity has been the problem of how to identify attacks spread across numerous sources, such that the individual activity of any given source remains modest, and thus potentially not particularly out of the ordinary. These scenarios can arise whenever a detector employs a threshold used to flag that a given candidate attack source has exhibited a suspiciously high level of activity (e.g., when conducting scanning or DoS flooding). Attackers can respond to such detection Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. procedures by employing multiple sources in order to thin out their activity to prevent any single source from exceeding the threshold; their attack becomes distributed and therefore potentially stealthy, i.e., hard to detect based on any individualized analysis.
In this work we present a general strategy for potentially detecting such stealthy activity, which consists of two basic steps. First, we employ the statistical technique of change-point detection to identify times during which a global property has shiftedindicating that, in aggregate, a site's activity reflects the presence of problematic activity. We then determine the range of time over which this activity occurred and, within that interval, identify which sources appear to have contributed to the activity.
In particular, we apply this approach to the problem of detecting distributed SSH brute-forcing: attackers employing a number of systems that each try different username/password combinations against a site's SSH login servers, hoping that one of them will stumble across a working combination made possible by a careless user. The threat of SSH brute-forcing is well-known: indeed, any SSH server open to general Internet access receives incessant probing by hostile remote systems that energetically attempt to locate instances of weak authentication [5] . The degree to which such attempts also occur in a stealthy slow-but-steady fashion, however, has attracted little study. The difference between single energetic probes and stealthy distributed ones is significant: defenders can easily detect the former, and therefore either block the activity or investigate it (to ensure none of the attempts succeeded). The latter, however, poses a much more difficult detection problem. If each host in a distributed brute-forcing attack itself only attempts username/password logins at a low rate, then distinguishing hostile activity from the inevitable login failures made by legitimate user errors becomes much more difficult. Yet the distinction is vital: a pattern of attempt/attempt/attempt/success made by a legitimate user simply reflects a set of typos, or a password that took a few stabs to remember; but by a distributed SSH brute-forcer, it provides the only slender indication of success amongst a mass of probing that in aggregate predominantly failed.
We aim to both provide an exemplar of our general strategy in terms of detecting distributed (but coordinated) SSH brute-forcing attacks, as well as developing an assessment of the prevalence of such attacks as seen over years of data. In terms of our two-step approach, we first identify attack epochs during which in aggregate we can with statistical confidence determine that some sort of SSH brute-forcing event occurred. Here, we employ changepoint detection framed in terms of a parameter that summarizes the network/server activity of groups of remote hosts-in particular, the aggregate login failure rate. Our second step classifies the hosts appearing during the detected epochs as either participants or non-participants in the activity, based on both individual past his-tory and "coordination glue", i.e., the degree to which a given host manifests patterns of probing similar to that of other hosts during the epoch.
We develop and evaluate our detector on 8 years of SSH login records collected via central syslogging at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, a large (≈ 4,000 employees and visitors) research facility. We measure and quantify the duration, intensity and behavior of the detected attacks. We find multiple large-scale coordinated attacks from botnets, the longest one spanning about 1.5 months. All the attacks we detect would have been completely missed by a point-wise host-based detector. We correlate these attacks with data from several other sources, finding that half of the large-scale incidents at the site are part of global attacks, with a significant average overlap of ≈ 70% attack hosts appearing at multiple sites in the same time span.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We begin with related work in § 2. § 3 details the characteristics of the dataset we use in developing and evaluating our detector. § 4 frames our detection approach. In § 5 we develop a model of the process by which legitimate users make authentication errors when attempting to log in, which serves as the basis for parameterizing our SSH password brute-force detector. We discuss our evaluation results and findings in § 6, and summarize in § 7.
RELATED WORK
The literature relevant to our work lies in three domains: (i) coordinated attack detection, (ii) SSH brute-force attack detection, and (iii) studies of the prevalence of SSH brute-forcing activity.
The detection of coordinated attacks has received little treatment in the literature. The earliest work of which we are aware is that of Staniford et al., who correlate anomalous events using simulated annealing for clustering [17] . Gate's work on coordinated scan detection is the most prominent subsequent effort in this domain [8] .
Given an input set of scan sources, Gate's algorithm extracts the subset of hosts that appear coordinated by using a set-covering approach; the premise is that the attacker divides the work among the coordinating scanning hosts in a manner that maximizes information gain while minimizing work overlap. For our purposes this work has two limitations: (i) the individual attack hosts require pointwise identification, and thus the approach will not find stealthy attacks, and (ii) the algorithm lacks a procedure for determining when a site is under attack. Other work has addressed the somewhat similar problem of detecting DDoS attacks, but these detection approaches face a difficult problem of how to differentiate attack participants from legitimate users [19, 16] .
With regard to SSH brute-forcing, host-based detection techniques such as DenyHosts [2] , BlockHosts [1] , BruteForceBlocker [9] , fail2ban [12] , and sshguard [3] block hosts that cross a threshold for failed attempts in a specified amount of time. Other work has developed network-based approaches. Kumagai et al. propose an increase in the number of DNS PTR record queries to detect SSH dictionary attacks [13] . This increase results from the SSH server logging the fully qualified domain names of the SSH clients attempting access. This work does not discuss how to establish detection thresholds, nor does it present an evaluation of the system's accuracy. Vykopal et al. develop flow signatures for SSH dictionary attacks [18] . They show that a large number of short flows having a few bytes transferred in both directions and appearing together in a short duration of time are indicative of failed login attempts, providing the means to then detect bruteforce attacks from flow data. Hellemons also studied the possibility of using only flow data to detect SSH brute-force attacks, modeling the brute-force attacks as consisting of three phases: scanning, brute-force and die-off (in case of successful compromise) [11] . They monitor the ranges of three parameters-flows-per-second, packets-per-flow and bytes-per-packet-to identify these phases. Both of these works test their detectors only on simulated dictionary attacks, and do not address how to distinguish instances of forgotten usernames/passwords from brute-forcers. More generally, none of these brute-force detection approaches have the ability to detect stealthy coordinated attacks.
Malecot et al. use information visualization techniques to detect distributed SSH brute-force attacks [14] . For each local host, the remote IP addresses that attempt to log in are displayed using a quadtree-a tree data structure formed by recursively subdividing two dimensional space into four quadrants. The procedure performs 16 iterations to map 32-bit IP addresses onto a quadtree, each time deciding the next sub-quadrant by looking at the next two bits of the IP address. The analyst then visually compares quadtrees for different local hosts to identify as coordinated attackers remote IP address(es) that appear in quadtrees of multiple local hosts.
Finally, regarding the prevalence of SSH brute-force attacks, Bezut et al. studied four months of SSH brute-force data collected using three honeypot machines [6] . They find recurring bruteforcing activity, sometimes with several weeks in between, indicating that the attacks target a wide range of IP address space. Owens et al. performed a measurement study of SSH brute-force attacks by analyzing data from honeypots on three networks-a small business network, a residential network, and a university network-for eleven weeks during 2007-2008 [15] . They find that the number of login attempts during different attacks varied from 1 or 2 to thousands. More than a third of the attacks consisted of ten or fewer login attempts. They find instances of both slow and distributed attacks designed to evade detection. They also find that precompiled lists of usernames and passwords are shared across different attackers, identifying five such dictionaries. Their study reveals that only 11% of the attempted passwords are dictionary words.
DATASETS AND DATA FILTERING
We evaluate our detector on eight years of SSH login data collected at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), a US national research laboratory. The temporal breadth of this dataset allows us to study attack patterns at the site across the years. We also draw upon SSH datasets from four other sites spread across the IP address space (and several geographic locations) to assess whether attacks we detect at LBNL reflect targeted behavior or indiscriminant probing. We refer to these sites as HONEY, RSRCH-LAB, HOMEOFF, and CAMPOFF, and describe them below. In this section we present these datasets and discuss ways in which we filtered the data for our subsequent analysis. Table 1 provides summary statistics for our main dataset, LBNL. This site's systems primarily reside in two /16 address blocks (from two separate /8's). Only a small fraction of the address space runs externally accessible SSH servers, providing access to both individual user machines and compute clusters. The benign SSH activity in this data consists of interactive as well as scripted logins.
Main dataset
For this site we have datasets collected at two vantage points: (i) logs collected by a central syslog server that records information about login attempts reported by (most of) the SSH servers, and (ii) flow data for SSH port 22 collected by border monitoring. For each login attempt, the syslog data provides the time, client and server 1 IP addresses, username on the server, whether the login succeeded, and the authentication type used. The flow data supplements this perspective by providing contact information (but no details) for attempts to access IP addresses that do not run an SSH server, or that run an SSH server that does not log via the central syslog server. This data thus enables us to establish the complete 2 set of machines targeted by an attack.
Filtering. For the central syslog data, we work with the subset of SSH authentication types vulnerable to brute-forcing (i.e., we omit those using public key authentication), about half of the attempts. We perform all of the characterizations and analyses in the remainder of the paper in terms of this subset.
In addition, we filter this dataset to remove individual bruteforcers that we can readily detect using a per-host threshold for the number of failed login attempts per remote host within a window of time. Given the ease of detecting these brute-forcers, they do not reflect an interesting problem for our detector, though they would heavily dominate the data by sheer volume if we kept them as part of our analysis.
To identify and remove such brute-forcers, we need to empirically establish reasonable thresholds for such a per-host detector. We do so by analyzing the process by which legitimate users make password authentication failures, as follows. We assume that any user who makes repeated failed login attempts followed by a successful attempt reflects a legitimate user. (This assumption may allow consideration of a few successful SSH brute-forcers as "legitimate", but these are very rare and thus will not skew the results.) Figure 1 plots the number of failed attempts such users make prior to finally succeeding. We see that instances exceeding 10 failed attempts are quite rare, but do happen occasionally. Accordingly, we consider 20 failed attempts as constituting a conservative threshold. We manually analyzed the instances of legitimate users falling after this cutoff (the upper right tail in the figure) and found they all reflect apparent misconfigurations where the user evidently set up automation but misconfigured the associated password. Thus, we deem any client exhibiting 20 or more failures logging into a single server (with no success) over a one-hour period with as a high-rate brute-forcer, and remove the client's entire activity from our dataset. Table 1 summarizes the brute-forcers removed using this definition.
Finally, to give a sense of the volume of activity that remains after these filtering steps, Figure 2 shows the empirical CDF of the hourly and daily numbers of successful logins. A typical day sees 500 successful logins (maximum seen: 1,200) involving 117 distinct users (maximum: 197).
Correlation datasets
The HONEY dataset reflects five manually identified SSH bruteforcing "campaigns" (our term for ongoing instances, as discussed later) as captured by 2 SSH honeypot servers in Norway [4] . Table 2 summarizes these campaigns, which for the most part we characterize as large-scale, persistent, and stealthy. For all but the last campaign, many of the remote clients would evade detection by our simple per-host detector.
The RSRCHLAB dataset reflects flow data from the International Computer Science Institute, a research organization in Berkeley, CA, with a /23 address block. The dataset spans the same time as that of LBNL, though due to the limitations of flow data, we cannot than real-valued. We do so for our subsequent development of the detector. We then accumulate Zn over time using the following (again discrete) test statistic: Sn = max(0, Sn−1 + Zn), where S0 = 0. In the case of no change, the value of Sn hovers around zero, but in the face of a change (increase), Sn starts to accumulate in the positive direction.
By convention, one terms the situation of the mean corresponding to normality as in-control. When the mean shifts by an amount Δμ, one terms the situation out-of-control, which corresponds to an attack in our problem domain. Note that the choice of Δμ is specific to the problem we design the detector to detect. In some situations, we might desire a small Δμ, while in others we might only have interest in detecting changes corresponding to a large value of Δμ. In practical terms, we achieve a given target Δμ by setting two detector parameters, k and H, as discussed below.
The algorithm flags an out-of-control situation when Sn crosses an operator-set threshold, H. The subsequent appearance of an event with normal mean marks the return of the situation to incontrol, and we reset the test statistic Sn to zero at this point. Thus, the CUSUM detector decides whether the mean has shifted or not according to the decision function Dn:
Determining CUSUM parameters and span of change. One tunes the parameters k and H of CUSUM based on: the amount of change Δμ to detect, the desired false alarm rate, and the desired time to detection. First, a general rule of thumb when designing a CUSUM detector to detect a mean shift of Δμ is to set k equal to half the change in shift [10] . The other parameter, H, controls both the false alarm rate and the detection speed. A lower H means faster detection but a higher false alarm rate.
To assess the balance between these two, we consider the effects of H on the average number of steps the CUSUM detector takes to raise an alarm under in-control and out-of-control distributions. (Note that the first of these corresponds to alarms reflecting false positives, while the latter corresponds to true positives.) We refer to these as in-control ARL (Average Run Length) and out-of-control ARL, respectively, and choose the value of H that results in the closest match with the desired ARLs.
To determine these ARLs, we can model the CUSUM process as a Markov chain with finite states X0, X1, . . . , XH , corresponding to the test statistic values Sn ≤ 0, Sn = 1, Sn = 2, . . . , Sn ≥ H respectively. (Recall that we constrain Z and thus S to discrete integer values.) Note that XH is the absorbing state. The transition probabilities of this Markov chain depend only on the underlying distribution of the random variable Z:
For the intuition behind this formulation, consider the first equation. If the cumulative sum has reached i (i.e., Sn = i, corresponding to the state Xi) then the possible ways for progressing from it to the state X0 (i.e., Sn ≤ 0) are to add a value of Z less than or equal to −i. A similar perspective holds for the other two equations. Given the complete transition probability matrix R of the Markov chain, we can compute the above probabilities and the in-control ARL as:
where R is the transition probability matrix, I is the (H + 1) × (H + 1) identity matrix, and 1 the (H + 1) × 1 matrix of ones [7] . We can likewise compute the out-of-control ARL of the detector using the same formulation but substituting k = k − Δμ [10] . We can then estimate the point of the true start of a change by subtracting the value of out-of-control ARL (detection delay) from the time of detection.
Finally, the Aggregate Site Analyzer reports the information from CUSUM in the form of attack epochs. An attack epoch constitutes of: (i) the set of consecutive out-of-control events (i.e., i = 1 . . . n where Di = 1), and (ii) the set of previous events also incorporated into the epoch based on stepping back through the number of events given by the out-of-control ARL.
Each attack epoch can reflect instances of either singleton or coordinated attacks. The first of these corresponds to a global perturbation of the site-wide variable Y induced by a single source. The second refers to the perturbation arising due to the combined action of multiple sources. Since in this work we focus on distributed attack epochs, we need at this point to exclude singleton attacks. We do so by checking whether CUSUM still flags any events in the epoch as reflecting an attack even if we remove the remote host with the highest number of failed login attempts. If so, we mark the attack epoch as a coordinated attack epoch, and proceed to the second component of our analysis. Otherwise, we discard the epoch as uninteresting (which occurred about 3/4s of the time).
Attack Participants Classifier
The second component of our general detection approach addresses how to go from the global site-wide view to that of individual entities. Here we employ a set of heuristics to analyze activity in the attack epochs flagged by the Aggregate Site Analyzer to identify who participated in the attack. (The need for heuristics rather than more principled identification arises almost fundamentally from the problem domain: if we could directly identify participants with confidence, we could very likely use the same approach to develop an effective pointwise detector and not have to employ a separate approach for detecting stealthy distributed activity in the first place.)
For our particular problem of detecting distributed SSH bruteforce attacks, the individual entities we wish to identify are remote hosts (clients). In addition to the problem of including remote hosts corresponding to legitimate users within it, a distributed attack epoch-particularly if spanning a long period of time-can capture multiple brute-forcers, some of whom might operate in a coordinated fashion, while others might function independently. For example, an attack epoch we detect that includes activity from five remote hosts might in fact be composed of four coordinating remote hosts and one singleton brute-forcer that happens to probe the site at the same time.
For each remote host that appears during the attack epoch, we make a decision about whether to classify it as a legitimate remote host, a singleton brute-forcer (operating alone), or a bruteforcer working with other hosts as part of a coordinated attack. This decision might require manual analysis, as sometimes the categories have significant overlap. To illustrate, Figure 4 diagrams the characteristics that remote hosts in each of these categories can manifest. Legitimate users that fail due to forgotten or mistyped usernames/passwords generally exhibit only a modest number of attempts, similar to low-rate distributed brute-forcers. A remote instead used a beta-binomial distribution. We see from the inset that the actual data exhibits more variance than we can capture using a binomial model. The beta-binomial model provides a significantly better fit as it allows for an extra variance factor termed over-dispersion. Beta-binomial is the predictive distribution of a binomial random variable with a beta distribution prior on the success probability, i.e., k ∼ Binomial(p, n) where p ∼ Beta(α, β). Then for a given n, α and β, we have:
We can interpret the success of this fitting in terms of lack of independence. If all login attempts were IID, then we would expect to capture GFI effectively using a binomial distribution. The need to resort to a beta-binomial distribution indicates that the random variables lack independence or come from different distributions, such that the probability of success has a beta-prior instead of being constant. This makes sense intuitively because (i) different users will have different probabilities of success, and (ii) the login attempts from a single user are not independent: one failed login attempt affects the probability of success of the next login attempt (negatively if the user has forgotten their password, positively if they simply mistyped it).
EVALUATION
In this section we apply our detection procedure to the extensive LBNL dataset. We discuss parameterizing the detector, assess its accuracy, and characterize the attacks it finds, including whether the attacks appear targeted or indiscriminant.
Parameterization
Our procedure first requires selecting a mean shift Δμ that we wish to detect. We set this to 10 failed logins per event of 100 logins, basing our choice on the stealthiest attack we wish to detect without overburdening the analyst. On average this site sees 500 logins per day, so a threshold of Δμ = 10 bounds the number of attempts a brute-forcer can on average make without detection to 45 (9 attempts × 5 events) spread over a day. Fitting our betabinomial distribution ( § 5) to the 2005-2008 data yields the parameters μ = 7 and σ = 4.24, and so our chosen value corresponds to a shift in mean of approximately 2σ. (Note that this is different from stating that we detect a "two sigma" event, because due to the cumulative nature of the detection process, it takes significantly more perturbation to the site's activity than simple stochastic fluctuations to reach this level.)
We choose the other parameter, the decision threshold H, based on computing ARLs using the Markov chain analysis sketched in § 4.1. Table 3 shows the in-control and out-of-control ARLs for k = 5 and varying values of H. (We use k = 5 based on the ruleof-thumb of setting k = Δµ 2 [10] .) Given these results, we choose H = 20, as this gives a quite manageable expected false alarm rate of one-per-3,720 events, which, given that the site produces about 5 events per day, translates to an average of two alarms per year, and thus an expected 16 false alarms for the complete dataset. This level detects actual stealthy attacks after 5 events (50 brute-forcer login attempts, since the computation is for a shift in the mean of Δμ = 10). In a practical setting, H = 10 (one false alarm per month) could work effectively.
To validate the assumptions underlying our detection model, we ran the CUSUM detector on the "cleaned" data (per § 5) to compare the expected false alarms with empirical false alarms. The detector H In-control ARL Out-of-control ARL  1  9  1  10  144  3  20  3,720  5  30  99,548  7  40 2,643,440 9 flagged a total of 12 false alarms, reflecting cases where the failure of benign users lead to the alarm.
Assessment of Detection
The two components of our detector can each exhibit false alarms: false coordinated attack epochs and false attack participants. We can readily identify the former by inspection, as incorrect attack epochs can manifest in one of three ways: (i) the epoch consists of a singleton brute-forcer and a collection of legitimate users who had failures, (ii) the epoch consists of non-coordinating brute-forcers having no apparent coordination glue, and (iii) bad luck: the epoch consists of just legitimate users who failed. The latter kind of false alarms (false attack participants) pose a harder challenge to classify, given we lack ground truth. Since LBNL didn't itself detect and assess the majority of the attacks we detect, we use the following heuristic to gauge whether our procedure correctly classified a remote host as a brute-forcer. We inspect the the host's login activity in the attack epoch along with its future activity. If none of this succeeded, we can with high confidence deem that host as a brute-forcer. For hosts that ultimately succeed, we confirm whether the success reflected a break-in by checking whether LBNL's incident database eventually noted the activity.
Running the procedure over 8 years of data, the Aggregate Site Analyzer detected a total of 99 attack epochs. After then processing these with the Attack Participants Classifier, we find nine 5 represent false alarms. We detect a total of 9,306 unique attack hosts participating in the distributed attack epochs, two of which succeed in breaking-in. The procedure classified only 37 benign hosts as attack hosts, reflecting a very low false alarm rate. On days that include an attack epoch, we find on average about 100 benign R, U pairs filtered out using our past-history assessment, but on average only about 1.7 "forgotten username" instances detected and removed. Figure 7 shows the empirical CDF of the span of detected attack epochs. These coordinated attacks often span multiple days, and sometimes multiple weeks. The majority of the attacks exhibit strong coordination glue in terms of either the set of local machines probed or the usernames targeted for brute-forcing. Of the 90 true attack epochs, 62 have common-set-of-local-machines glue and 25 have username-"root" glue. Only 3 epochs did not manifest any glue we could identify; these epochs probed machines across a wide range of addresses and using a dictionary of generic usernames, such as mysql and admin. Figure 8 shows the attack hosts participating in the various distributed attack epochs over time, where we number distinct hosts consecutively starting at 1 for the first one observed. The significant overlap of attack hosts across attack episodes shows that many of these attacks employ the same botnet. We then analyzed the coordination glue in these attack epochs to consolidate the set of epochs into attack campaigns. We use the following rules to group epochs into campaigns based on observing evidence that the same attacker conducting different attack epochs that work towards the same goal: (i) epochs with the same common-set-oflocal-machines coordination glue, and (ii) epochs appearing on the same day with username-root coordination glue. Our detector considers these as multiple attack epochs rather than a single attack because this is indeed how the campaign proceeds, stopping for a few hours/days and then reappearing. Using these rules, we group the 62 attacks with common-set-of-local-machines glue into 12 distinct attack campaigns. Only a few of the 25 epochs group using heuristic (ii), condensing the root-set to 20 campaigns. This leaves us with a total of 35 attack campaigns. Table 4 summarizes the magnitude, scope and stealthiness of the attacks we detect. All of these attacks were stealthy when observed from the viewpoint of individual hosts; on average the attack hosts made ≈ 2 attempts per local machine per hour. We can however detect a large fraction of these attack campaigns using a point-wise network-based detector that looks for high-rate hourly activity in terms of either the total number of failed attempts or the number of local hosts contacted. Note that we also detect attacks that a site cannot detect using either host-based or network-based point-wise detection (campaigns 5, 7 and 8 in Table 4 ). Finally, two of the campaigns succeeded, the first of which (campaign 1) as best as we can tell went undetected by the site.
We also find a difference in the characteristics between attacks that have set-of-local-machines coordination glue versus the ones that only have username-root glue. The latter tend to target a wide range of the site's address space and often involve just a few attack hosts brute-forcing at a high rate. Attacks having set-of-localmachines coordination glue often exhibit the pattern of the attackers stopping and coming back. We did not find any sequential pattern in any of these campaigns; rather, the attackers targeted servers spread across the address space, often including addresses in both of LBNL's distinct address blocks. We also did not find any pattern among the local servers in terms of belonging to the same research group or compute cluster.
Establishing the scope of attacks
Next, we attempt to establish which attacks specifically targeted the LBNL site versus global attacks that indiscriminantly probed the site. To do so we look for whether the attack hosts of a given campaign appeared in any of our four correlation datasets, HONEY, RSRCHLAB, HOMEOFF, and CAMPOFF.
We find that 16 campaigns appear in at least one of these four datasets. These include five username-root coordination glue attacks and all but one of the attacks with set-of-local-machines coordination. Figure 9 plots the percentage overlap of the attack hosts detected in the global attacks at LBNL with that at other sites, showing a high overlap in most cases. We investigated campaign 5, which does not appear at any of the other sites, and found that it indeed targeted LBNL, as the attack hosts all probed a set of six usernames each valid at the site. As shown by the hourly rates in Table 4 , this targeted attack also proceeded in a stealthy fashion, with each remote host on average making only 9 attempts and contacting 3 local servers per hour. It's possible that some of the other campaigns also specifically targeted LBNL, though for them we lack a "smoking gun" that betrays clear knowledge of the site.
Finally, to give a sense of the nature of global attacks, Figure 10 shows the timing patterns of login attempts at the LBNL and HONEY sites during part of campaign 8. From the clear correlation (though with a lag in time), we see that the activity at both reflects the same rate (which varies) and, for the most part, the same active and inactive periods.
CONCLUSION
In this work we propose a general approach for detecting distributed, potentially stealthy activity at a site. The foundation of the method lies in detecting change in a site-wide parameter that summarizes aggregate activity at the site. We explored this approach in concrete terms in the context of detecting stealthy distributed SSH brute-forcing activity, showing that the process of legitimate users Table 4 : Characteristics of the detected coordinated attack campaigns. In Appearances, numbers in parentheses reflect how many attack epochs occurred during the given interval. Attrs. summarizes different attributes of the activity: L = coordination glue was set of local machines, R = coordination glue was username "root", X = no discernible coordination glue, S = stealthy, T = targeted, t = possibly targeted but no corroborating evidence, ! = successful, !! = successful and apparently undetected by the site.
failing to authenticate is well-described using a beta-binomial distribution. This model enables us tune the detector to trade off an expected level of false positives versus time-to-detection. Using the detector we studied the prevalence of distributed bruteforcing, which we find occurs fairly often: for eight years of data collected at a US National Lab, we identify 35 attack campaigns in which the participating attack hosts would have evaded detection by a pointwise host detector. Many of these campaigns targeted a wide range of machines and could possibly have been detected using a detector with a site-wide view, but we also find instances of stealthy attacks that would have proven very difficult to detect other than in aggregate. We correlated attacks found at the site with data from other sites and found many of them appear at multiple sites simultaneously, indicating indiscriminant global probing. However, we also find a number of attacks that lack such global corroboration, at least one of which clearly targeted only the local site. Some campaigns in addition have extensive persistence, lasting multiple months. Finally, we also find that such detection can have significant positive benefits: users indeed sometimes choose weak passwords, enabling brute-forcers to occasionally succeed.
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